be a great literary device, but it makes little sense in a dynamic global economy. Since early research on the middle-income trap was published in 2012, the world economy
has grown by about 25 percent－presumably boosting the moving target of a middle-income threshold by a comparable magnitude over t
hat period. Largely for that reason, recent research has couched the trap not in terms of an absolute threshold, but as relative convergence to high-income cou
ntries. From this perspective, danger looms when developing economies’ per capita income approaches 20-30 percent of the level in high-income economies. Giv
en that China will hit about 30 percent of the United States’ per capita GDP (in PPP terms) in 2019, it must be time to worry!
Slowing growth not as alarming as feared
Third, not all growth slowdowns are alike. A country’s GDP is a broad aggregation of a multiplicity of activities across sectors, busin
esses and products. Structural shifts from one sector to another can give the appearance of a growth discontinuity that may be nothing mo
re than the outcome of a deliberate rebalancing strategy. This is very much the case with China today, given its shift from
higher-growth manufacturing and other “secondary” industries to slower-growing services, or “tertiary” industries. To the extent
that this shift is the intended result of China’s strategic rebalancing, a slowdown in growth is far less alarming.
will be significant demand for top-quality goods and services,” he told China Daily.
Noting that many European companies are renowned for their innovation and reliability, Bagnasco said that “there shou
ld be plenty of business to be done” in Xiongan. In June, Mats Harborn, chamber president, paid a visit to Xiongan and wa
s received by Chen Gang, vice-governor of Hebei province and director of Xiongan’s management committee.
Chen said he hopes the chamber will take an active role in such areas as green developm
ent, intelligent technologies and innovation in Xiongan, an official news release from the new area said.
“The EU Chamber of Commerce in China has been building relationships in Xiongan for some time now, and the me
eting in June was just one part of that,” Bagnasco said, adding that the meeting was a good opportunity to furt
her develop relationships and deal with more concrete matters, such as specific investment mechanisms.
Find X in Paris, marking its official foray into Europe. As of January, it had entered nine European markets, including Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Wu Qiang, who is in charge of Oppo’s overseas business, said the company is not adopting an aggressi
ve strategy in overseas markets. Instead, it strictly follows CEO Chen Mingyong’s principle of “eating rice bite by bite”.
“We will only enter the next market after doing a good job in existing markets,” Wu said.
Oppo’s intensified interest in foreign countries came after the Chinese sma
rtphone market hit a saturation point, with shipments declining for several quarters.
From September to December of 2018, smartphone shipments in China plunged almost 10 pe
rcent year-on-year, according to data from market research company International Data Corp or IDC.
Though Oppo outgrew the industry average to achieve an annual expansion rate of 1.5 pe
rcent in that time-frame, there is still a pressing need to look for new opportunities, Wu said.
litical and diplomatic means alone cannot support Japan’s global ambitions. A military presence at the global level is needed if Japan is to expand its political clout.
Compared with old European powers like the UK and France, Japan’s military influence in Europe is jerkwater. But it is different after Japan signed military pa
cts with these countries – Japan’s political influence is increasing because of the support of military powers.
With the influence of the UK and France declining in the Asia-Pacific region, their military activities can get
the support from Japan via the ACSA, which will immensely boost Japan’s military clout. These European countries will not look at Ja
pan through the military lens, which will effectively strengthen Japan’s political might.
Meanwhile, exchange of military provisions will help enhance people-to-people exchanges between Japan and these countries, ex
erting Japan‘s cultural influence in these countries and beyond. Even if Japan fails to become a permanent member of the UN Security Co
uncil, it can still play a major role in the world. This has been part of the global strategies of the Abe administration.
We can see that Japan signing ACSAs with six countries is not just for defense and military purposes, it’s part of an overall plan to influence economics, po
litics, military and culture, which is a long-term strategic mind-set of the Japanese government.